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The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies:
Between a Currency and a
Financial Product
Hadar Y. Jabotinsky*
Cryptocurrencies are electronically generated and stored
currencies by which users can trade either real or virtual objects
with one another. As these digital assets gain popularity, the issue
of how to regulate them becomes more pressing. Cryptocurrencies
are attractive due in part to their decentralized, peer-to-peer structure. This makes them an alternative to national currencies which
are controlled by central banks. Given that these cryptocurrencies
are already replacing some of the “regular” national currencies
and financial products, the question then arises—should they be
regulated? And if so, how? This paper draws the legal distinction
between cryptocurrencies which are in fact currency and those
which are securities disguised as currency. It further suggests that
in cases where a token is indeed a security, regular securities regulation should apply. In all other cases, anti-fraud measures should
be in place to protect investors. Further regulation should only
be put in place if the cryptocurrency starts increasing systemic
risk in the general financial system.
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INTRODUCTION

Facebook Inc. unveiled plans to launch a cryptocurrency in a move that could diversify its business
from advertising while expanding into financial
services long dominated by Wall Street. The cryptocurrency, called Libra, will be a secure blockchainbased payment system backed by hard assets and
designed for ordinary users, making it among the
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boldest efforts yet to bring digital currencies into
the mainstream . . . . The Securities and Exchange
Commission, Wall Street’s main overseer, has
emerged as the most robust U.S. regulator of cryptocurrency projects . . . .1
Bitcoin, Ether, DAO, and Facebook’s new Libra project are
all types of the emerging technology of cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies are electronically generated and stored currencies
by which users can trade either real or virtual objects with one
another, bypassing traditional central clearinghouses. This technology is driving a change in the global economy, both in business
and finance.2
Widespread knowledge of cryptocurrencies is leading towards a
surging number of people using the technology. The attractiveness
of cryptocurrencies is due in part to their decentralized, peer-to-peer
structure. This makes them an alternative to national currencies
which are controlled by central banks. 3 This is especially apparent
in times of financial instability, when cryptocurrencies usage tends
to rise upwards in the beginning of financial distress. 4 Given that
these cryptocurrencies are starting to replace some of the traditional
national currencies and financial products, the question then
arises—should they be regulated? And if so, how? Some countries,
such as China and South Korea, prohibit Initial Coin Offerings
(“ICOs”)5 altogether, while others strive to reach an understanding

1

Jeff Horwitz & Parmy Olson, Facebook Unveils Cryptocurrency Libra in Bid to
Reshape Finance, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookunveils-crypto-wallet-based-on-currency-libra-11560850141
[https://perma.cc/X2CLHSKC].
2
DONG HE ET AL., VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 5
(2016).
3
Roee Sarel, Your Bitcoin is Mine: What Does Law and Economics Have to Say About
Property Rights in Cryptocurrencies? 9–10 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
4
See Maureen Farrell, Bitcoin Prices Surge Post-Cyprus Bailout, CNN MONEY (Mar.
28,
2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/28/investing/bitcoin-cyprus/index.html
[https://perma.cc/SM5S-A55R]; see also Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Roee Sarel, How Crisis
Affects Crypto: Coronavirus as a Test Case 8 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
5
An ICO is the process whereby “real” money is exchanged in return for the token.

2020]

THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

121

of the currencies in order to come up with coherent regulation. 6
In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought
enforcement actions against virtual currency-related investments,
asserting that they were in fact securities.7 A year later, the SEC
issued an investor alert concerning cryptocurrencies stating:
The rise of Bitcoin and other virtual and digital
currencies creates new concerns for investors. A
new product, technology, or innovation—such as
Bitcoin—has the potential to give rise both to frauds
and high-risk investment opportunities. Potential
investors can be easily enticed with the promise of
high returns in a new investment space and also may
be less skeptical when assessing something novel,
new and cutting-edge.8
In July 2017, the SEC issued the “DAO Report,” an investigation related to the issue of 1.15 billion DAO tokens that were meant
to create a new form of corporate governance.9 In the report, the
SEC discusses the issue of applying the federal securities laws to
DAO tokens concluding that although no enforcement action should
6

Saheli Roy Choudhury, China Bans Companies from Raising Money Through ICOs,
Asks Local Regulators to Inspect 60 Major Platforms, CNBC (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/chinese-icos-china-bans-fundraising-through-initialcoin-offerings-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/MS64-VSUT]. The EU has recently
published a proposal for regulating crypto-assets which is likely to be ratified,
it makes a distinction between utility tokens, asset-reference tokens (stable coins)
and payment tokens (proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Markets in Crypto-Assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM
2020), sec. 9).
7
See In re Voorhees, No. 9592, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1922, at *3, *7 (June 3, 2014); SEC
v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2013).
8
Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC (May
7, 2014) (emphasis omitted), http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investor
alertsiabitcoin.html [http://perma.cc/NFB3-QTUN].
9
SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [perma.cc/CMQ2-M9SQ] [hereinafter DAO REPORT].
DAO tokens are tokens which are meant to automate organizational governance and
decision making. SEE CHRISTOPH JENTZSCH, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATION TO AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2016), https://archive.org/stream/
DecentralizedAutonomousOrganizations/WhitePaper_djvu.txt
[https://perma.cc/2EL27TU2].
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be taken due to the conduct and activities known to it at the
time, the DAO tokens are indeed securities under the Securities Act
of 1933 (“Securities Act”)10 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“Exchange Act”).11 Later on, in September 2017, the head
of the SEC clarified that ICOs are one of the SEC’s top regulatory
priorities.12 In April 2019, the SEC finally issued its long-awaited
framework for “investment contract” analysis of digital assets.13
However, the SEC guidelines are only recommendations which are
not legally binding and at some points they still leave considerable ambiguity with regard to the question of what types of cryptocurrencies should be regulated by the SEC and how.
The question of how to regulate cryptocurrencies is compelling
throughout the life of the coin, but is of special interest during the
ICO because the value of the cryptocurrency depends not only on
the value of the currency, but also on issues of security.14 As these
coins exist in the virtual world, the sites on which they are traded
are vulnerable to hackers.15 Thus, even if hacking the network of the
coin itself is difficult, other sites such as cryptocurrency exchanges
are more susceptible to theft.16
The ICO process is also vulnerable. An ICO is a process in
which people buy virtual tokens from the makers of the crypto-

10

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1933).
DAO REPORT, supra note 9.
12
John McCrank, SEC Chief Says Cyber Crimes Risks are Substantial, Systemic,
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-enforcement/sec-chiefsays-cyber-crime-risks-are-substantial-systemic-idUSKCN1BH094
[https://perma.cc/2ZJW-X9VZ].
13
SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS
(April 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysisdigital-assets [https://perma.cc/J7E4-PETZ] [hereinafter SEC GUIDELINES]. An investment
contract constitutes a security according to U.S. law, thus the SEC has the power to regulate
it.
14
Lucinda Shen, Hackers Have Stolen $400 Million From ICOs, FORTUNE (Jan. 23,
2018) https://fortune.com/2018/01/22/ico-2018-coin-bitcoin-hack/ [https://perma.cc/
D8SU-8AJP].
15
Id.
16
Brian Fung, Why Bitcoin Exchanges Keep Getting Hacked – and How to Protect
Yourself, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/06/20/why-bitcoin-exchanges-keep-getting-hacked-and-how-to-protectyourself/ [https://perma.cc/DE8Q-UCK8].
11
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currency.17 As the startup issuing the tokens grows, these tokens are
expected to increase in value.18 This is a method of raising investment via crowdfunding, as a means to reduce transaction costs associated with raising capital elsewhere.19 In the past, crowdfunding
was not possible due to the heavy transaction costs associated with
raising small amounts of money from many different investors. 20
Today, however, this problem is solved by using the internet, which
reduces transaction costs and allows for a more efficient allocation
of money.21 Although the makers of these tokens chose to raise
money through ICOs and not through IPOs, there are similarities
between buying some of these tokens and buying stock in an Initial
Public Offering (IPO) of a company.22 Unlike in an IPO, potential
investors in an ICO now receive little or not enough information.23
Additionally, until 2017, ICOs have remained mostly “under the
radar” of the securities authorities.24 However, ICOs are frequently the target of cyberattacks and—without proper disclosure rules—
investors sometimes pay for tokens but are left with nothing.25
A famous, but not uncommon, example of such a cyberattack
occurred on July 17, 2017 when the CoinDash website launched an
ICO. The website was hacked and $7M of the investment, all in
17

Christian Hofmann, The Changing Concept of Money: A Threat to the Monetary
System or an Opportunity for The Financial Sector?, 21 EUR. BUS. ORG L. REV. 37, 40
n.10 (2020).
18
Why Invest in an ICO?, CRYPTONEWS, https://cryptonews.com/guides/why-invest-inan-ico.htm [https://perma.cc/C6TX-9GK5].
19
Usman W. Chohan, Are Cryptocurrencies Truly Trustless?, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND
MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 77, 84 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019).
20
Steven C. Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Law, 1 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
21
Id.
22
In an IPO, early investors, such as large institutions, purchase some of the stocks at a
discount via early agreements. Once the stocks are sold to the public, the institutional
investors which invested in the stocks sell their stocks on the market and make a profit. See
Othalia Doe-Bruce, Blockchain and Alternative Sources of Financing in CRYPTOFINANCE
AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 91, 98 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019).
23
See generally Seth Holoweiko, What is an ICO? Defining a Security on the
Blockchain, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 4.
24
In 2017 the SEC issued the first report relating to cryptocurrencies: the DAO Report.
See DAO REPORT, supra note 9.
25
Sondes Mbarek et al., Are Virtual Currencies Virtuous? Ethical and Environmental
Issues, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 29, 41 (Stéphane Goutte et al.
eds., 2019).
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Ethereum’s cryptocurrency, Ether, went to hackers and not to
CoinDash in exchange for tokens.26
Although the technology underlying most cryptocurrencies is
very similar, the logic behind them differs. Some cryptocurrencies
function as regular national currencies with traditional currency
traits.27 As such, they provide a medium of exchange, unit of
account, and/or store of value.28 Other cryptocurrencies, however,
may represent other rights as well. This interesting phenomenon
causes some cryptocurrencies to be viewed as closer to real national
currencies while others are viewed as closer to financial products
(such as securities or derivatives). 29
This Article explores how the “safety” of these coins relates
to issues of disclosure. It seeks to answer two key questions—how
should cryptocurrencies be regulated, and how much disclosure
should be demanded from the corporations that issue them? The
academic debate about what a cryptocurrency is—whether it is a
currency or some type of different financial product—has already
begun with Bitcoin.30 This Article expands the current Bitcoin
debate to other types of cryptocurrencies and argues that different
types of cryptocurrencies require different regulatory approaches.
This argument is supported by comparing different types of cryptocurrencies to various financial products (such as stocks, derivatives, forwards, and options)—a discussion that, to date, the literature has not addressed enough. It is important to note from the outset that this Article deals with regulatory questions pertaining to
financial regulation and leaves aside questions regarding other types
of regulation such as anti-money laundering, tax regulation, and

26

John Leyden, CoinDash Crowdfunding Hack Further Dents Trust in Crypto-Trading
World,
THE
REG.
(July
17,
2017),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/
2017/07/18/coindash_hack/ [https://perma.cc/V9JK-5XGM]. In this specific case
investors received the tokens they paid for and CoinDash was left with the loss.
27
See generally CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE (Stéphane Goutte et
al. eds., 2019).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2011).
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fraud, which are also relevant to the broader discussion of regulating
cryptocurrencies.31
Parts I–III of this Article set out the theoretical background
of the regulation of securities and financial products in the United
States. Part I reviews the principals behind securities regulation and
supervision in general, to assist in the discussion of how cryptocurrencies should be regulated. This discussion will include the
theory of financial markets and why we need to supervise them.
As most ICOs take place outside of the United States, Part II
discusses the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities laws. Part III will
then explain what constitutes a security under U.S. law. Next, Part
IV analyzes the different types of cryptocurrencies. Finally, Part V
presents arguments for how cryptocurrencies should be regulated.
I.

THE NEED FOR SECURITIES REGULATION

As mentioned in the introduction, cryptocurrencies are either
meant to replace fiat currencies or are a substitute for some of the
traditional financial assets. As such, before discussing how to regulate them, we must first understand why we regulate financial
markets and what financial regulation is meant to achieve. Financial
markets bring together buyers and sellers of financial instruments,
establishing the right price for the traded financial instrument.32
The price of the traded financial instrument is determined—like the
price of any other product in regular non-financial markets—by the
supply and demand curve.33 However, financial instruments have a
special trait that distinguishes them from non-financial products or
goods: the benefits which they confer are largely unknown to a large
extent because the product’s prospective earnings are unknown. 34
31

See, e.g., Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of
Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 56–57 (2015–2016) (discussing how
relative anonymity and an absence of regulating intermediaries make it more difficult to
identify those who transact in illicit value transfers); see generally Hadar Y. Jabotinsky &
Michal Lavi, Speak Out: Verifying and Unmasking Cryptocurrency User Identity
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
32
See JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N. GORDON,
COLIN MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 101 (2016).
33
See id.
34
See id.
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Therefore, their value is based on the buyers’ predictions of potential value increase over time.35
The process of predicting future value of financial instruments
and subsequently pricing them is at the heart of the financial
markets. Additionally, the process of predicting and pricing provides a main function to financial markets—delivering information
about investors’ beliefs regarding the future price of the assets sold
in the market.36 Therefore, the price of a financial instrument should
reflect the future price at the date the investor expects to sell the
instrument plus the present value of the stream of future dividend
payments and interest rate.37 But in order to determine the components of the price and to be able to put a price tag on the instrument,
investors should have all the relevant information about the firm or
the underlying asset of the financial instrument. 38
This is the main role of the securities regulator—providing
information to the market, mainly through the vehicle of disclosure
requirements which, in turn helps the market assign the correct price
tag to the products sold.39 For example, the price of the firm’s securities is expected to include any information about the firm’s management quality as long as the information is public.40 If the information is positive, the price of the share is expected to increase as
investors rush to purchase it. In other words, there is a hypothesis
that as long as the market receives correct and full information about
a firm, the market will be efficient. 41
Some investors might occasionally gain access to private
information which has not yet been disclosed. For example, a firm’s
management might know about a strategic change the firm is about
to undertake before it is announced to the general public. Managers
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id. at 102.
38
Id. at 108.
39
Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, Financial Regulation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 5 (A. Marciano & G.B. Ramello eds., 2017).
40
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32.
41
Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
59, 60 (2003). Note, however, that this hypothesis has been criticized as markets seem to
over or under react to new pieces of information and to take into account irrelevant and
plausible information. See, e.g., ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 105.
36
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who have this information are called “insiders.” 42 As most investors
are unaware of this information, it is not likely that they will trade
on it and influence the price of the shares.43 Therefore, in order
to prevent investors from trading to their advantage by using
undisclosed, privileged information, all securities markets around
the world prohibit insider trading. 44 Consequently, uninformed
investors can enter the market trusting that all investors have the
same level of information when making a trading decision and
that insiders cannot benefit from their additional knowledge at the
expense of other investors.45
As a result of financial market anomalies, securities regulation
is also needed in order to ensure efficient allocation of resources.
If a share is mispriced, meaning that the price does not accurately
reflect all the relevant information, an incorrect investment will be
allocated to that share.46 Thus, securities regulation plays a crucial
role in reducing product information asymmetries and improving
the pricing mechanism of securities.47
Securities markets, like other markets, incorporate price
information which results from the activity of the traders buying and selling securities in the market. Therefore, information is
needed to make the markets more efficient and to receive an
accurate price for the products sold in the market. 48 The efficiency
of the market is a function of how fast the market can gather,
process, verify, and distribute the information among traders. 49
Information intermediaries such as underwriters, auditors, lawyers,
CRAs, and analysts help the traders understand and evaluate the
inherent risks of the traded products. 50 These intermediaries
analyze information with respect to the following—the issuer,
its business model, ownership, financial situation, earnings, and
42

ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 104.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 106.
46
Jabotinsky, supra note 39, at 4.
47
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 106.
48
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanism of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 593 (1984).
49
See id.
50
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 119.
43
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strategic plans; the issuer’s market and industry, new regulations,
new entrants, and the status of its competitors; past trading in the
firm’s securities; and other significant events, such as political
changes or natural disasters which might have an effect on the
issuer’s business.51
In a perfect world, investors would pay for the information they
receive from these intermediaries. However, information is a public good and thus it is not easily excludable; once produced and
transmitted to the investors who pay for it, there is a chance
that other investors will try to get a free ride by obtaining the
information without paying for it.52 The result is a problematic funding model—instead of being paid by the investors, the intermediaries are paid by the issuer of the financial product. 53 This gives rise
to a series of conflicts of interest and to entrenchment of the intermediaries’ incentives.54 Regulation is also necessary to decrease and
manage these conflicts of interest.55
Last but not least, regulation is also needed to reduce systemic
risk—the risk that the entire market or financial system will collapse.56 This risk is increased by links and interdependencies, where

51

Id. at 118. See generally Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial
Intermediaries Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 271 (2001) (broadly discussing the role of
financial intermediaries); George M. Giaglis, Stefan Klein & Robert M.
O’Keefe, The Role of Intermediaries in Electronic Marketplaces: Developing a
Contingency Model, 12 INFO. SYS. J. 231 (2002) (discussing the role of intermediaries in
online markets).
52
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 121.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
For example, public companies in the United States are required to provide the public
with independently audited financial statements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(aa), 78(m)(a)(2). Credit
Rating Agencies (CRA) are required to use standardized forms which enable users to
compare ratings between different CRAs and to disclose their rating methodologies. DoddFrank Wall Street & Consumer Protection Act § 932(a)(8) (2010); Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations: Correction, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,576 (Oct. 14, 2014) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249, & 249b). Analysts are regulated in the United States
according
to
the
Financial
Industry
Regulatory
Authority.
FINRA
Rule 2241, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,482 (July 22, 2015); FINRA Rule 2242, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,628
(June 7, 2016).
56
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega et al., Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of
Regulatory Architecture, in MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATORY POLICIES: THE NEW ROAD
TO FINANCIAL STABILITY? 207–14 (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2011).
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the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascading failure.57 It is also related to externalities—firms taking on more
risk than is economically efficient because the results of the realization of the risk will be borne by society as a whole and not solely by the entity taking the excessive risk. 58 Financial regulation is
necessary to prevent or minimize this risk.
For all these reasons, securities markets should be regulated—
and indeed they are. However, for obvious reasons, securities regulation applies only to instruments that are considered securities.
Therefore, before we can further discuss the regulation of cryptocurrencies, we should first examine what constitutes a security under
U.S. law. This is meaningful because if an instrument is considered
a security, then the offering of that instrument is subject to securities
regulation, which means it must be registered under the Securities
Act unless it falls under one of the exemptions offered by the
law.59 Such registration increases the cost of selling the instruments.
Requiring cryptocurrencies to register would significantly increase
the cost of the ICO.60 Furthermore, if cryptocurrencies are indeed
considered a security, the sites which assist in the trading of tokens
and in handling the ICO would face regulatory issues as they may
be treated as unregistered brokers or investment advisors according
to SEC rules.
All this is true with reference to U.S. regulation. However, to
cover the topic fully, a preliminary discussion must be made with
respect to the question of the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities
law. As a vast number of ICOs occur outside the U.S. territorial
borders, the relevant question is—do they fall under U.S. law?
If the answer is yes—then do they constitute a security under
U.S. law?

57

Id.
Jabotinsky, supra note 39, at 4.
59
15 U.S.C. § 77(z)(3) (establishing exceptions to the Securities Act).
60
ICO Law and Compliance: Is Your ICO Subject to Regulation?, SKALEX,
https://www.skalex.io/ico-law-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/3VAF-WCFY].
58
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II. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW

The United States has vast and long-standing experience in seeking to apply national securities laws extraterritorially.61 The courts
have developed a few tests to justify extraterritoriality 62—the statutory position strengthens these tests, especially concerning antifraud prohibitions.63
Prior to the decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank,64
the Second Circuit paved the way for the extraterritoriality of the
securities regulation’s anti-fraud provisions by mainly applying
two tests: (1) the effects test, which examined whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial and foreseeable negative effect on
the United States or its citizens;65 and (2) the conduct test, which
by contrast required the wrongful conduct to take place within the
United States.66
In Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell 67 and subsequent cases, courts applied the conduct test to cover gray areas
which were not addressed by the effects test. 68 The conduct test was
able to bridge this gap because it does not require proof of harm but
merely requires wrongful conduct. 69 Thus, the conduct test also
assisted U.S. courts in obtaining jurisdiction in cases where the
harmful act was conducted inside the United States but targeted

61

See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P(b), 929Y; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated
by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
62
SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
63
See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
64
561 U.S. 247 (2010).
65
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foreign investors.70 The court held that the conduct test would be
satisfied if “(1) the defendant’s activities in the United States were
more than ‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2) these activities or culpable failures to act within the
United States ‘directly caused’ the claimed losses.”71
Although these are two separate tests—each of which can be
applied by itself—the courts could also combine them in order to
strengthen a given case. The Second Circuit, for example, did this
in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.72 Throughout the years, these
tests were adopted in a number of courts across the United States,
each tweaking the form of the test to fit the decisions of the court at
hand.73 When applying the conduct test, for example, the DC Circuit
demanded that “the American-based conduct at issue had to itself
constitute a securities law violation ….”74 This application of the
test is much stricter than the application of the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits which required that the conduct made on U.S. soil be
material to the success of the fraud and that it constitutes a substantial part of it.75 The most lenient form of the test was used by the
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits which required that only part
of the activity of a securities fraud to be carried out on U.S. soil.76
The different test interpretations of the courts made it difficult for
individuals and the market to draw a bright line demonstrating what
falls under the test and what does not.77
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This ambiguity also existed with respect to the effects test.
Courts disagreed regarding the degree to which the behavior in question needed to have an effect on the United States or its citizens. 78
This question of degree only became more difficult to answer with
the development of the internet and other new technologies. 79 American legal scholars and practitioners felt a growing unease when considering the possibility that these tests might breach another country’s sovereignty and lead to a deterioration in foreign relations. 80
In 2010, the Supreme Court cancelled both the conduct and the
effect tests in Morrison.81 This case involved Australian shareholders who purchased stock on an Australian stock exchange and who
filed suit in the United States against an Australian bank for violating U.S. securities law.82 The plaintiffs contended that the bank
made material misstatements with regard to an expected purchase of
a mortgage servicing company by the bank. 83 The District Court
ruled that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case
and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision. 84 The Supreme Court
agreed with the lower court’s dismissal but found the lower courts’
reasoning85 for deciding whether to grant extraterritorial applicability to U.S. securities laws flawed.86 The Court held that no explicit
statutory instruction existed for the extraterritoriality conduct of
U.S. securities laws.87 However, after summing up the shortcomings
of the conduct and effect tests and ruling them out, the Court introduced a new test. According to the Court, the main test that should
be used in order to determine the reach of Section 10(b) of the
78
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Securities Exchange Act (“Section 10(b)”), which deals with fraudulent behavior, is the transactional test.88 The Court held that in order to qualify for the test, the fraudulent behavior must accompany
the purchase or the sale of a security, whether or not it is a registered
security on a national securities exchange. 89 The Court further emphasized that one of the fundamental dimensions of the case is the
fact that the plaintiffs and the defendant were foreign. 90 For the test
to be applicable, the fraudulent behavior should involve “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities….”91
However, the new transactional test left the market confused.
Some argued that foreign transactions are protected as long as the
securities are listed on a U.S. exchange.92 Others disagreed and
claimed that the language used by Justice Scalia and the majority
shows that the Supreme Court believed that the extraterritoriality of
Section 10(b) applies only when the security transactions
occurred within the United States.93 The test also severely restricted
U.S. regulators’ ability to prosecute persons who violate U.S.
securities laws but trade outside the United States. 94 This led to a
concern that U.S. regulators would not be able to protect the market’s integrity, leading to a loss of investor confidence in the securities markets.95 Consequently, Congress decided to intervene and
restore both the effects test and the conduct test in actions brought
by the SEC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) by enacting a new provision in the Dodd-Frank Act.96 The new provision
established a statutory basis for extraterritoriality of the anti-fraud
provisions in both the Securities Exchange Act and the Securities
Act which stipulates:
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. The district courts of the United States and the United States
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
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Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 268.
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Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P(b), 929Y.
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courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of
an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the
Commission or the United States alleging a violation
of the antifraud provisions of this title involving:
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the
United States and involves only foreign investors;
or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States.97
The new provision clearly provides the SEC and the DOJ with
the power to prosecute in situations of offshore securities fraud.98
This provision, combined with the Morrison decision, equips U.S.
regulators with extraterritoriality powers with respect to the antifraud provisions of securities laws.99 As discussed in Morrison, the
Supreme Court clarified that the transactional test can be inferred
directly from the anti-fraud provisions—therefore, the SEC can
enforce against fraudulent extraterritorial actions connected to U.S.
securities transactions, even if the fraudulent actions have an extraterritorial dimension.100 Section 30 of the Exchange Act is another
source of extraterritorial power, as it provides the SEC with the ability to prosecute a broker or a dealer who commits a securities fraud
offshore in order to circumvent U.S. securities regulation.101 In order
to use this provision, the SEC would need to promote rules in
accordance with this provision.102 A third and perhaps most powerful basis for extraterritoriality is the new section added to Section
929P of the Dodd-Frank Act.103 This section overcomes a situation
in which a case does not meet the requirements of the transactional
test. In such cases, the SEC can still bring enforcement actions
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against the perpetrator by using the conduct or effects tests which
were enacted into the legislation.104
In the case of cryptocurrencies, a great deal of ICOs are
conducted outside the United States. However, if the SEC believes
that the issue or the purchase of the tokens has a “foreseeable substantial effect within the United States,” 105 it can still press charges
against issuers or traders of the token that violate the U.S. securities
laws. The next step of the analysis should then ask—what constitutes a security under U.S. law?
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SECURITY UNDER U.S. LAW?

The Securities and Exchange Commission issued an
investigative report today cautioning market participants that offers and sales of digital assets by
“virtual” organizations are subject to the requirements of the federal securities laws. Such offers and
sales, conducted by organizations using distributed
ledger or blockchain technology, have been referred
to, among other things, as “Initial Coin Offerings”
or “Token Sales.” Whether a particular investment transaction involves the offer or sale of a security—regardless of the terminology or technology
used—will depend on the facts and circumstances,
including the economic realities of the transaction.
“The innovative technology behind these virtual
transactions does not exempt securities offerings and
trading platforms from the regulatory framework
designed to protect investors and the integrity of
the markets,” said Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director
of the SEC’s Enforcement Division.106
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Section 5 of the Securities Act and the pursuant SEC rules are
full of prohibitions, conditions, and exceptions with regard to the
registration of securities.107 However, the basic principle is clear—
unless exempted by law, all securities offerings must be accompanied by registration with the SEC.108 An issuer is prohibited from
selling a security and entering into a contract of sale109 until the registration statement with the SEC is in force. 110 The question is then,
what would be considered a “security” under U.S. federal law?
The United States regulates securities mainly under two laws:
(1) the Securities Act, and (2) the Exchange Act. These two pieces
of legislation were enacted by Congress following fraudulent
sales and lack of information in the U.S. securities markets which
led to the 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent Great Depression.111 The definition under the Exchange Act describes a “security” as any of the following.112
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index
of securities (including any interest therein or based
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation
107
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in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time
of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.113
The Supreme Court observed that the definition of “security”
includes “commonly known” documents which are traded for
investment or speculation as well as certificates of interest or
participation in profit sharing mechanisms.114 In another ruling, the
Supreme Court further stated that when an instrument falls under
what is commonly known as a security, there is no need for
courts to analyze each instrument on a case-by-case basis since
some instruments are clearly “securities,” in accordance with the
legislator’s intention.115
If a financial instrument or investment does not fall under
what is “commonly known” as a security, it may still be considered
as such according to the definition of an “investment contract.”
This term is the basket term by which many assets have been
determined to be securities and is also the term which is analyzed by
the SEC Guidelines from April 2019.116 Investment contracts were
defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.117 To fall under the definition, an
instrument must meet three main criteria: (1) an investment of
money; (2) a common enterprise; and (3) an expectation of profits
which are derived solely from the efforts of others.118 Over the
years, courts have maintained most of this definition, but replaced
the word “solely” with the question of whether the efforts made by
the managers of the firm (other than the investor) are undeniably

113
114
115
116
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significant ones.119 This definition alone already dictates a need for
differing regulatory responses to cryptocurrencies that change value
based on the efforts of others, and those that do not.
IV. DIFFERENT TYPES OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

Most current cryptocurrencies which exist today are based on a
technology called the “blockchain.”120 This technology connects
users to one another through a series of blocks, which together build
a platform for digital assets.121 A blockchain is usually managed by
a peer-to-peer network, in which peers collectively adhere to a protocol for validating new blocks.122 Once a block is formed, it is impossible to alter it without traces.123 Put simply, it is like having a
common Excel page shared by an entire community of users. Once
something is changed on one Excel sheet, the same Excel sheets on
all the computers of all of the users are updated automatically. Since
it does not exist in any centralized physical location, hacking it is
almost impossible.124 In other words, the blockchain is a distributed
ledger which maintains a constantly growing structure of blocks that
preserve data and hold batches of separate transactions.125 The completed blocks are added in a linear and chronological order.126
Each block contains a timestamp and information link which points
to a previous block.127 Blockchain technology makes use of smart
contracts, which are run and verified by many computers to ensure
trustworthiness and allow users to instruct the computer program
to transfer the currency from one to another given that certain

119
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conditions apply.128 In other words, they are programs that execute
“if this happens, then do that” commands.
In March 2013, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) released its guidance on
virtual currencies.129 In these guidelines decentralized virtual
currency is defined by FinCEN as including “virtual currency
(1) that has no central repository and no single administrator, and
(2) that persons may obtain by their own computing or manufacturing effort.”130 The Financial Action Task Force (the international
organization for the fight against money laundering) described it as:
A digital representation of value that can be digitally
traded and functions as: (1) a medium of exchange;
and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of
value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e.,
when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer
of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or
guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above
functions only by agreement within the community
of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is
distinguished from fiat currency (a.k.a. “real currency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which
is the coin and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in
the issuing country. It is distinct from e-money,
which is a digital representation of fiat currency
used to electronically transfer value denominated in
fiat currency.131
128
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These definitions of virtual currencies—also popularly known
as cryptocurrencies—are valid definitions for all cryptocurrencies
discussed in this Article.
In general, cryptocurrencies have diverse purposes. Some
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, are used as regular currency and
enable payments on the blockchain.132 Other cryptocurrencies, such
as Ether, are used to execute smart contracts which replace traditional intermediaries in the financial markets. 133 Some cryptocurrencies exist as a platform for developing new cryptocurrencies, while
others, like the KIN token by Kik, are issued as a means to raise
capital for the firm issuing the ICO.134 However, the complication
does not end there, some cryptocurrencies were created to promote
a social cause, such as Solar Coin,135 which is meant to promote solar electricity generation, while others, such as Ether, are meant
for traditional business purposes. These differences are crucial when
trying to design a financial regulatory regime for cryptocurrencies.
Next, this Article will survey some of the most common cryptocurrencies, while emphasizing the differences between them. These
distinctions will then be used to design a framework for regulating
different types of cryptocurrencies.
A. Bitcoin
Based on a computer science research paper by Satoshi
Nakamoto, Bitcoin was created in 2009.136 Nakamoto designed a
peer-to-peer network which allowed users to transfer Bitcoins to
others using their computers or smart-phones. 137 The Bitcoin system
is a cloud-based decentralized currency system which does not rely
on a central authority, such as a central bank or a company, to issue
132
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Bitcoins or to verify the transactions of its users. 138 Instead, transactions are verified and processed by using principles of cryptography.139 Individual users on the blockchain can generate new
Bitcoins through a process called “mining.” They do so by contributing their computing power to perform complicated calculations
that enable transactions on the blockchain network, secure the network, and keep users in sync.140 If the user is the first to contribute,
the system rewards her/him with a new Bitcoin. The mining process
helps the blockchain to continue and to be constantly verified. 141
Bitcoin is often referred to as the first “digital currency.”142
Indeed, Bitcoin shares certain characteristics with currency, but it is
also a distributed ledger system through which property titles can be
recorded and documents can be authenticated. 143 As such, in many
ways, it replaces the traditional intermediaries in the financial markets. Before Bitcoin was invented, an intermediary was necessary to
make an electronic transfer. Nowadays, Bitcoin makes the intermediaries redundant as the system records all transactions and all users
can observe the transactions on the blockchain. Furthermore, the
system ensures that once a user has sent money to another user,
the money is also removed from the sender’s account. 144 Each new
transaction on the blockchain will first check that the money
intended for transfer has not already been spent. 145 This initial check
solves the problem of “double spending,” 146 which occurs when a
participant simultaneously sends the same single unit of currency to
two different users on the net.147
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Upon entering the system, users receive a private key—similar
to an account code—which enables the user to access his or her account.148 Additionally, a public key is issued and used by others who
would like to transfer Bitcoins into this account; this number is similar to the IBAN number used by banks in order to enable international money transfers.149 As users do not expose their identity on
the network, anonymity is maintained.150 As noted above, other
users on this network are called “miners.” These “miners” allow the
network to use their personal computers and to invest their resources
in making the “blocks” on the blockchain faster and safer in exchange for receiving new Bitcoins which are mined from the system.151 Once the system reaches twenty-one million Bitcoins, mining will no longer be an option.152 Bitcoin does not have an underlying asset, thus its price does not depend on an asset price but rather
on the demand for Bitcoins.153 This demand is also a derivative of
how safe the users believe Bitcoin and its blockchain technology
are. In fact, the relevant uncertainty of Bitcoin holders with regards
to the token is apparent in the token’s price volatility.154 For example, for the period ranging from October 2016 to October 2017, the
market capitalization of the Bitcoin “increased from $10.1 to $79.7
billion, while the price jumped from $616 to $4800.” 155
B. Ether
Ether is a cryptocurrency developed by the Ethereum Foundation.156 Ethereum developed its own blockchain which enables
the fast execution of smart contracts and allows users, through
its open source, to create their own cryptocurrencies.157 Users of the
148

Ruoke Yang, When is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. TECH.
POL’Y 99, 102 (2013).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Shaen Corbet, Charles Larkin, Brian Lucey, Andrew Meegan & Larisa Yarovaya,
Exploring the Dynamic Relationships Between Cryptocurrencies and Other Financial
Other Financial Assets, 165 ECON. LETTERS 28, 29 (2018).
154
See Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 4, at 21.
155
Corbet et al., supra note 153, at 28–29.
156
See ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/dapps [https://perma.cc/4FZR-5JVX].
157
Id.

2020]

THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

143

Ethereum blockchain are able to create an automatic supply chain
which incorporates both financial and physical needs. The Foundation itself describes its Token in the following way:
Ether is a necessary element—a fuel—for operating
the distributed application platform Ethereum. It is a
form of payment made by the clients of the platform
to the machines executing the requested operations.
To put it another way, ether is the incentive ensuring
that developers write quality applications (wasteful
code costs more), and that the network remains
healthy (people are compensated for their contributed resources).158
In other words, anyone who wants to use Ethereum’s blockchain capabilities can only do so by buying the foundation’s cryptocurrency. Indeed, looking at the changes in price of Ether, it is highly
affected by the decisions of large corporations to join Ethereum’s
blockchain.159 For example, as pictured in the graph on the next page
(“Graph A”), the June 2017 surge in the value of Ether was primarily
the result of large corporations such as Microsoft and Intel deciding
to join the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance (EEA). 160
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Graph A

C. DAO
DAO tokens, invented and issued by Slock.it, are intended to be
an electronic way to improve corporate governance using the blockchain network and the layer of smart contracts it offers. 161 According to the white paper of the firm, the DAO is:
The first implementation of a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) code to automate organizational governance and decision making. The
code can be used by individuals working together
collaboratively outside of a traditional corporate
form. It can also be used by a registered corporate
entity to automate formal governance rules contained
in corporate bylaws or imposed by law.162
As stated, the DAO token is intended to enable corporations
using it to replace traditional corporate governance mechanisms
with automated contractual terms which are enforced by using the
smart contracts on the blockchain.
161
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DAO tokens were issued in an ICO in 2016.163 Over a period of
less than a month—from April 30 until May 28—1.15 million DAO
tokens were exchanged for approximately twelve million Ether.164
At the ICO closing time, the estimated value of DAO tokens raised
in Ether was $150 million USD.165 In exchange for Ether, DAO
tokens were created and assigned to the blockchain address of the
person or entity sending out the Ether.166 The holders of the DAO
tokens were given both ownership and voting rights while standing
to earn profits as a return on investment from projects funded by
DAO.167 If these projects turned out to be successful, DAO holders would receive the right to vote on whether to reinvest in new
projects or to distribute the profits to themselves. 168
In order to receive funding in DAO for a project, the “contractor” had to submit a proposal for a project which could provide DAO
token holders with a return on their investments.169 To do so, the
contractor had to write a smart contract, publish it, deploy it on the
Ethereum blockchain, and post details about it on the DAO website—a website formed by Slock.it in order to promote the DAO tokens.170 Proposals, which include a link to the smart contract’s
source code, could be viewed and voted upon in the DAO, as well
as other publicly accessible websites.171 In order to post a proposal,
the contractors needed to possess at least one DAO token and submit
a deposit using Ether tokens.172 If the proposal did not receive the
quorum vote of the DAO token holders, the deposit would be forfeited.173 Before a proposal could be uploaded to the DAO website,
it was examined by “curators”—a group of people chosen by
Slock.it who were responsible for examining the proposals for cyber
security issues.174 These curators made sure the proposals originated
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
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from a credible user on the blockchain and decided which of them
could be submitted to the DAO website and funded by DAO. 175
D. Libra
The latest—and currently one of the most discussed cryptocurrencies—is the Libra project by Facebook. 176 The Libra token will
allow users to send money to others or purchase products with
almost zero fees. It is intended to be used as a global coin which
will, in part, replace some of the fiat currencies.177 The Libra will
be held on a wallet application, such as Facebook’s planned Novi
wallet (previously named Calibra) which will be built into Messenger, Whatsapp, and its own app. 178
So, how will Libra work? People will be able to cash in local
currency, receive Libra, spend the Libra as they would any other
currency, and cash out whenever they want. 179 To avoid the fluctuation in Libra’s value, it is tied to a basket of bank deposits and
short-term government securities—in this manner it is what is
known as a “stablecoin.”180 The Libra Association—a Swiss based
association which will oversee the development of the token,
control the reserve of assets which stabilizes Libra’s value, and
decide on governance rules for the blockchain—will be able to
change the balance of the composition of the reserve in order to control for major price fluctuations.181 Every time a user will ask to sell
its Libra, the Libra Association will issue a selling order for the fiat
currency the user requested. To accomplish this, the Association
will work with a list of authorized resellers. 182
175
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The founding members of the Libra Association paid a
minimum of $10M to join—in return they received Libra Investment Tokens.183 These Investment Tokens will allow members to
receive dividends from the interest earned on assets in the reserve. 184
The possibility to receive dividends from the interest is in large what
attracted the Libra Association Members to join, because if a large
number of users start to use Libra, the reserve will grow and the
interest will be significant.185
Libra—unlike its fellow cryptocurrencies DAO, Bitcoin and
Ether—will run on a blockchain which is not truly decentralized. 186
Although it is designed like other blockchains with the use of
Merkle trees to guarantee the integrity and a network of nodes, only
Libra’s founding members—currently there are twenty of them—
will be able to run a node.187 Therefore, the transaction ledger will
only be accessible for Libra’s founding members. 188
As one can see, these four types of cryptocurrencies—Bitcoin,
Ether, DAO and Libra—differ vastly from one another. These differences give rise to interesting questions about the regulation of
cryptocurrencies. First, we ask, under what circumstances are cryptocurrencies considered securities?
V. FINANCIAL REGULATION, CYBER REGULATION, AND THE REGULATION OF
CRYPTOCURRENCIES

Unlike general cyber regulation which focuses mainly on
privacy issues, regulation of cryptocurrency should also focus on
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the effects it may have on investors and on financial markets.
Some aspects should be regulated like any other financial product.
Financial regulation is needed mainly to protect consumers and to
ensure stability of financial institutions.189 A financial regulator
plays a crucial role in providing information to the market, mainly
through disclosure requirements, which in turn helps the market assign the correct price to the products190 and prevents the problem of
a market for lemons—a market filled with low quality products. 191
A market for lemons refers to the problem of quality and uncertainty
in markets where good and bad products are sold and the buyers
cannot tell the good from the bad.192 In the field of financial products, regulation helps set minimum standards for products, helping
clear the market of lemons.193 This is essential since, in this case,
financial regulation protects the market—it helps efficiently allocate
credit.194 In the absence of financial regulation, some investors
would be apprehensive about entering the market—this would reduce opportunities for corporations seeking to raise capital. 195
Another problem with financial products relates to asymmetric
information and adverse selection. Adverse selection refers to the
problem of hidden information.196 When parties hold private,
non-verifiable information they can, in theory, impose higher costs
on their contracting parties who cannot tell the reliable service providers from the dangerous or more costly ones.197 The parties which
impose the highest costs will be disproportionately likely to enter
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into a contract at a given price as they know that they can
extract more rent.198 However, the contracting party knows that the
more risky party will be the one drawn to the contract and will thus
raise the price of the contract, ultimately driving out the “good”
parties, as they know that they are not risky and will not be willing
to contract at such a high price.199 Here, too, regulation is needed in
order to protect the market.
If we examine cryptocurrencies from the perspective of
protecting the market and the financing opportunities within it,
allowing those cryptocurrencies which are in fact securities to be
issued in an ICO bypasses regulatory requirements and may lead to
suboptimal results when it comes to financing opportunities in the
financial markets. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the problems of asymmetric information within cryptocurrencies and lack of
ability to assess the financial product are heightened by the existence
of cybersecurity problems.200 The value of the currency depends not
only on its real-world value but also on its resilience to hackers. Here
too, moral hazard issues may come into play causing a firm selling
cryptocurrency to behave differently prior to the purchase of its
tokens by investors than after the purchase. The best way to prevent
this from occurring is through regulation. For this reason, regulation
enforcing disclosure on cryptocurrencies, which are closer in nature
to securities, is essential.
However, in the field of cryptocurrencies, disclosure requirements hardly exist. Thus, sometimes problems of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and markets for lemons can occur. Therefore, it is in the interest of “good” or “reliable” cryptocurrencies that
some sort of disclosure would be required of them. The question of
what should be disclosed—if anything at all—depends on the purpose of the specific token.
Bitcoin, for example, really does resemble other kinds of fiat
currencies. Its price is determined by supply and demand and is not
based on the “efforts of others.” Trying to regulate this token as if
it were anything other than a currency would not only be wrong, but
198
199
200
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also diminish its value. Other cryptocurrencies, such as DAO, Ether,
and Libra do, however, bear a striking resemblance to securities.
In fact, it seems very likely they are indeed securities—in this case,
Ether and DAO were issued without compliance with securities laws
and regulations. To illustrate these differences, the sections below
examine the implications of each of these different cryptocurrencies
being a security.
A. The Implications of Bitcoin, DAO, Ether, and Libra Being a
Security
As previously mentioned, the United States heavily regulates
the issue of securities both under state and federal law. Therefore,
defining a specific cryptocurrency as a “security” under the federal
or the state “blue sky”201 laws has serious implications for producing
the token, trading in the token, and analyzing its underlying technology. As mentioned earlier, some cryptocurrencies are indeed not
securities while others should be considered securities under U.S.
law. In order to make the distinction, the following sections will
focus on three main laws: (1) the Securities Act of 1933; (2) the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (3) the Investment Company
Act of 1940. 202
1. The Securities Act of 1933
The main goal of the Securities Act is to ensure that all relevant
information is disclosed to the public so that investors are able to
evaluate the value of the securities in the market and make
informed investment decisions.203 In order to do so, the Securities
Act requires registration before the issuance of securities. 204 The
registration entails filing a registration statement with the SEC,
201
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202
In so doing, this paper follows in the footsteps of Jeffery E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry,
supra note 140, at 4–8, by adopting their framework in explaining why Bitcoin is not a
security but that Ether and DAO should both be considered one.
203
Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information”, and the
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1601 (2012); Alberts & Fry, supra note
140, at 4.
204
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a), 77e(c).

2020]

THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

151

which includes a prospectus providing all the relevant information
to investors regarding the firm whose shares are about to be
offered.205 Bitcoin was established by an anonymous person or
persons, thus it is not known who would be obligated to register the
issuance of the cryptocurrency.206 However, in the case of Ether,
DAO, and Libra it is very clear who established the currencies and,
thus, who has an obligation to register the token prior to the ICO.
Furthermore, unlike Bitcoin—where mining provides continuous
production of new tokens and raises the possibility of seeing miners
as issuers207 which could be expected to result in dramatically
reduced mining efforts—DAO and Libra cannot be mined by the
general public. Thus, the question of how to define miners is irrelevant in reference to DAO and Libra.
A second issue has to do with how cryptocurrencies are traded.
In the case of securities without a valid registration statement,
Section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act allows transactions that fall into certain narrow categories and follow strict requirements. 208 Thus,
if a person buys securities from an issuer in order to resell them, the
buyer is considered an “underwriter” and must meet the registration
requirement.209 Since the blockchain is a public ledger and as transactions are publicly disclosed, all users exchanging Bitcoins on the
blockchain would need to meet the registration requirements. 210
The same would be true for DAO, Ether, and Libra because it is
logical to demand registration from the enterprise which issued the
cryptocurrency and not from the users trading it on the blockchain.
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Under the Exchange Act, any person whose business includes
effecting transactions in securities—be it one’s own securities
or other people’s securities—is considered a broker or a dealer. 211
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This impacts stock exchanges trading cryptocurrencies. If Bitcoin,
DAO, Ether, and Libra are securities, then anyone who facilitates
the buying or selling of any of these cryptocurrencies must register
with the SEC as a broker or a dealer, unless they are exempt from
the regulation.212 In addition, anti-fraud obligations are in place
under the Securities Exchange Act for anyone selling or buying
securities.213 If Bitcoin, DAO, Ether, or Libra are indeed securities,
these restrictions would also regulate the statements issued by the
sellers of these tokens.214 These regulations could be a potential
solution to false statements occasionally made during an ICO. 215
3. The Investment Company Act of 1940
Mutual funds and private investment funds are regulated under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 ( “Investment Company
Act”).216 Under the Investment Company Act, an “investment
company” is defined as, among other things, “ . . . any issuer which
is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities . . . .”217 If any
of the cryptocurrencies mentioned in this Article are indeed securities, then any entity which is established to invest, hold, or trade
them may be subject to the requirements of the Investment Company Act.218 These requirements include registration with the
SEC—unless excluded from the regulation, usually by limiting
the number of investors or by doing business only with “qualified
purchasers,” considered to be more sophisticated. 219
B. Are Cryptocurrencies Securities?
United States securities regulations are drafted broadly so that
they can cover most of the transactions in which money is raised
from investors.220 The literature has already noted that under the
212
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214
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regulation—based on an analysis of case law which scrutinizes and
clarifies the term “security”—Bitcoin does not qualify as a security
due to the fact that it does not fall under the definitions of any
of the common types of securities nor under the term “investment contract.”221 But what about other cryptocurrencies such as
DAO, Ether, and Libra?
1. Is DAO a Security?
It seems that DAO is the clear-cut case in which a cryptocurrency is indeed a security and issuing it at an ICO was most
probably meant to avoid the more costly procedure of an IPO.
According to Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court illustrates
that “ . . . some instruments . . . are by their nature investments.”222
Indeed, the DAO easily falls under the characteristics of “stocks.”223
The Supreme Court defined the characteristics of a “stock” as: the
capacity to appreciate in value, the right to receive dividends depending on profits made by the firm, negotiability, having voting
rights which are dependent on the number of shares one owns, and
the ability to be “pledged or hypothecated.” 224
The DAO token meets all of the above criteria. The investors
purchasing the token have the right to vote on projects in which the
DAO will be invested, they are entitled to a return on their investments if such projects succeed, and their investments can increase
or decrease in value. In fact—unlike Bitcoin holders—they are
entitled to participate in the economic success of the entity. 225
Since DAO falls into the definition of a “stock,” there is no need
to further examine whether it meets other definitions of securities
221
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such as futures, derivatives, swaps, or options. If the DAO were
positioned on a scale of securities, its token would most likely be
located in very close proximity to actual securities. This is not the
case for Ether.
2. Is Ether a Security?
The most recent and hottest debate among SEC officials relates
to the question of whether Ether is a security.226 On June 14, 2018,
William Hinman, the director of the division of corporation finance
at the SEC stated that “ . . . in cases where there is no . . . central
enterprise being invested in or where the digital asset is sold only to
be used to purchase a good or service available through the network
on which it was created,” that digital asset is “out of the purview of
U.S. securities laws.”227 The market tends to interpret this statement
as confirmation that Ether is not a security, and consequently, during
the course of the hour from when the statement was issued, the price
of the token jumped from $469 to $516 USD.228 However, this
question has not yet been formally decided and thus is an interesting
topic for discussion.
Unlike DAO, Ether does not fall within the classic definition of
a stock. Although it can increase or decrease in value and its holders
are able to exchange it, Ether does not provide token holders with
dividends or voting rights—both of which are crucial to the definition of a stock.229 Additionally, similar to Bitcoin,230 it does not meet
the definition of “security future”—a contractual agreement to sell
securities, an index, or any interest that is based on the two.231 It is
also not a “securities-based swap” as it is not a put, call, floor, or
any similar investment which is based on an index or a security loan,
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nor is it based on the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of events. 232
However, a financial investment which does not fall into any of the
categories that define “security” might still be considered one if it
falls under the basket term “investment contract.” 233
A financial instrument must satisfy three rules to be classified as
an investment contract. There must be: (1) an investment of money;
(2) common enterprise; and (3) expectation of profits which are
derived solely from the efforts of others. 234
In the case of Ether, there is indeed an investment of money.
Purchasers invest money in return for the token. This falls under the
broad definition of an investment of money.235 In addition, The
Ethereum Foundation, the foundation behind Ether, is a Swiss nonprofit organization.236 As such, it can fall under the definition of a
common enterprise according to the strict vertical communality
approach.237 Under this approach, courts have examined whether the
assets of the investors were influenced by the success and
efforts of the firm seeking the investment. 238 In this case, it is clear
that the marketing efforts of the foundation affect the tokens held by
the investors. Last but not least, unlike Bitcoin, investors who invest
in Ether do expect to gain from profits which are derived from the
efforts of others. To use the Ethereum blockchain, investors are
required to pay in Ether.239 Thus, the efforts of the foundation to
promote extensive use of its blockchain also affects the profits of
all Ether holders. Therefore, it is not farfetched to say that purchasers could have the reasonable expectation that the value of their
token will rise due to the managerial efforts of the Ethereum Foundation managers. This, on its own, is enough to meet the requirements test in Howey.240
232
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Therefore, since the Ether token meets all three criteria required
of a financial instrument in order to be considered an “investment
contract,” Ether is in fact a security under U.S. law and is subject to
all securities requirements set by the law.
3. Is Libra a Security?
Like Ether, the Libra token also does not fit the traditional
definition of “stock” as it does not provide token holders with
dividends or voting rights.241 It also does not meet the definition
of “security future” which is a contractual agreement to sell securities, an index, or any interest that is based on the two.242 It is also
not a “securities-based swap” as it is not a put, call, floor, or any
similar investment which is based on an index or a security loan,
nor is it based on the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of events. 243
However, similar to Ether, the interesting question is—is Libra an
“investment contract”?
Recall the basics of the Howey test and the cases which
followed, as well as the SEC’s Guidelines—in order to meet the
criteria of being an “investment contract” the financial instrument
must satisfy three rules.244 There must be: (1) an investment of
money; (2) common enterprise; and (3) expectation of profits which
are derived solely from the efforts of others.245 Examining Libra
through these three requirements shows that: (1) there is an investment of money; (2) the Libra Association is a common enterprise;
and (3) as Facebook plans to market and distribute Libra on
Whatsapp—Facebook’s own messenger and its standalone app
called Novi (a new Facebook subsidiary)—holders can definitely
expect to gain profits which are derived solely from the efforts of
241
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others. In addition, unlike Ether, the reserve ratio of the cryptocurrency—which affects the value of the token—will be determined
by the Association members.246 Therefore, Libra is even more susceptible to profits derived from the efforts of others than Ether.
Due to all that is mentioned above, it seems that the new Libra
is indeed an investment contract, even though the idea behind it
is to make it more similar to a fiat currency. Therefore, the Libra
Association will be well advised to issue the token in accordance
to US securities regulations.
C. How Should Cryptocurrencies be Regulated?
Strict anti-money laundering and anti-fraud measures should be
taken with respect to all tokens. This is especially true in an area of
new technology such as blockchain. Without proper measures to
prevent fraud, investor confidence in the market can collapse due to
a single case of fraud that becomes publicly known.247 This results
in investors changing their perceptions about the market, and in a
drop of financing opportunities for similar firms. 248 Investor confidence is crucial in sectors which rely on uncertain future events
and technological innovation. If not prevented in cryptocurrencies,
repeated and well publicized fraud cases can also be detrimental to
the future use of blockchain technology.
Indeed, fraudulent behavior is not scarce in the world of cryptocurrencies. On December 4, 2017, the SEC obtained an emergency
order from Eastern District of New York to enjoin an allegedly
fraudulent ICO scheme.249 The SEC alleged that Dominic Lacroix
and his company PlexCorps violated the anti-fraud and registration provisions of U.S. federal securities laws.250 Lacroix and his
company allegedly collected up to $15 million from investors in
exchange for digital tokens and promised them a thirteen-fold profit
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in less than a month.251 Following the complaint, the district court
granted the SEC’s request to freeze the defendant’s assets. 252
To prevent such fraudulent behavior and to protect the new
blockchain technology, all cryptocurrencies should be subject to
anti-fraud regulation. Regarding anti-money laundering regulation,
all cryptocurrencies should have a Know-Your-Client procedure
before allowing users to enter the blockchain. 253 In addition, tokens
should not be completely anonymous. Meaning, in the name of
privacy, blockchain users should not be able to ascertain the identity
of other blockchain users. Instead, the association or company
issuing the coin should be able to answer regulatory requirements
to unveil the identity of the users in order to expose money laundering and scams.
Regarding financial regulation, as previously identified in this
Article, different types of cryptocurrencies require different regulatory solutions.254 In order to determine the most relevant regulations,
we should first examine the token at hand and ask whether it falls
under U.S. securities laws or whether it is more similar to a fiat
currency.255 Unlike other financial investments, another important
step in classifying a specific cryptocurrency is to examine the purpose of issuing a token. In some instances, issuing the token in an
ICO is only meant to circumvent the stricter requirements of issuing
a security in an IPO or raising capital by approaching a venture
capital firm.256 But in other cases, issuing a token makes sense
beyond the financing opportunities for the firm issuing the token. 257
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This question should be taken into consideration by regulators
before they decide which type of regulation should apply.
After classifying the cryptocurrency, specific regulatory tools
should be applied. If the cryptocurrency is determined to be a security, all regulatory demands normally required of securities should
certainly be enforced. Regarding disclosure, the question would then
be: what should be disclosed to investors during the ICO?
1. Disclosure Requirements for Cryptocurrencies that are
Securities
Similar to IPOs, significant information asymmetries exist in
ICOs between the managers of the startup issuing the token and
the investors buying it. 258 The regulators seem to think that mandatory disclosure requirements are the answer to such information
asymmetries, and that retail investors would read information
that is provided to them. This is evident in the requirement of the
SEC to use “plain English” in the prospectus.259 However, it is
widely known that retail investors do not read all the technical information detailed in prospectuses’ hundreds of pages, nor do they
read the issuer’s mandated information in the secondary market.260
Rather, retail investors usually rely on the market price which embodies all the relevant information about the firm. 261
Still, requiring securities’ issuers to disclose all relevant, though
partially technical, information benefits investors. While in all likelihood most retail investors do not read the disclosed information, 262
underwriters, analysts, and sophisticated buyers, such as institutional investors, do.263 The fact that sophisticated market players
read and process information and determine the price of shares
allows all other investors to “free ride” their efforts to participate in
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the market.264 Furthermore, at the margins of the primary market,
where intermediaries are bypassed, disclosure requirements help
protect naive investors from buying overpriced securities as the regulators screen the prospectus before allowing the IPO. 265 This way,
cases of fraud are minimized and the required detailed information
makes punishing fraudsters easier “ex post.”266
When issuing shares, the issuer on the primary market must
disclose a vast amount of information. Such information should
include its own historical background as well as a detailed and technical description of the firm, the shares issued, and all other material
information that can be relevant to investors. 267 An important distinction between different regulatory regimes relates to the question
of whether only past information should be disclosed or whether forward-looking information should also be disclosed. Disclosing only
past events reduces the cost of disclosure and makes it easier for
investors to compare between different firms. However, forwardlooking information may also be valuable for investors and might
have an effect on the share’s price.268 The SEC has acknowledged
that the prospects for future earnings are important to investors and
so allows inclusion of some information of this type. 269
When issuing a token, which is a security under the legal
definition, the basic mandated disclosure should be the same for all
other securities. In the words of Jay Clayton of the SEC:
I believe that initial coin offerings—whether they
represent offerings of securities or not—can be
effective ways for entrepreneurs and others to raise
funding, including for innovative projects. However,
any such activity that involves an offering of
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securities must be accompanied by the important
disclosures, processes and other investor protections
that our securities laws require. A change in the
structure of a securities offering does not change
the fundamental point that when a security is
being offered, our securities laws must be followed.
Said another way, replacing a traditional corporate
interest recorded in a central ledger with an enterprise interest recorded through a blockchain entry
on a distributed ledger may change the form of the
transaction, but it does not change the substance. 270
Indeed, the managers of the enterprise issuing the token have
detailed information about their business, their plans and initiatives,
as well as their marketing capabilities—which are especially crucial
in the field of cryptocurrencies. They also have relevant information
regarding trends or issues that may affect their business, the value
of their token, future operating results, and/or financial conditions.
As mentioned in the introduction of this Article, the value of the
cryptocurrency depends not only on the value of the currency, but
also on issues of security.271 These issues are present in full force
during the period of the ICO. Therefore, unlike regular securities,
additional information should be disclosed to investors.
As with all regular securities, upon issuing an ICO, one of the
first disclosure requirements should pertain to the description of the
characteristics of the enterprise (usually a startup company) issuing
the token. This description should include an ecosystem in which
the new token is issued, a detailed description of the startup, its
incorporation and team details, and possible current and future
competitors. An in-depth description of the token, what it sets out to
achieve, and the reason why issuing it in an ICO is necessary to the
success of the product should also be included. Another relevant
question which must be addressed is—what will investors’ money
be used for? To what specific rights are they entitled upon the
270
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purchase of the token? Furthermore, an explanation of how the value
is created and how it enters the cryptocurrency ecosystem should be
provided to the investors. Here, the disclosure would explain how
the token is used and sold—that is, only in the specific app developed by the issuing startup or in other apps as well as how an investor sells his token.272 Governance issues should also be addressed,
including questions of: How does the startup issuing the token decide to add new features to it? How do they react to changes in computing technology? When and how do they decide to change network parameters? How would they manage crises and what mechanisms are there to detect and resolve bugs?273 In addition, a thorough
description of the measures taken to secure the ICO should be provided. These details should include an explanation of the blockchain
infrastructure supporting the ICO, whether it is public or private,
and if the code has been publicly published.274 Furthermore, there
should be a disclosure regarding the identity of the person who wrote
the token issuance contracts and the software used should be in
place. Security measures should also be disclosed—for example,
was a cybersecurity audit performed prior to the ICO? 275 And if so,
what were the results?
With that said, disclosure requirements are only useful if there
are information intermediaries in the market that can provide the
token issuer with their reputation. It is therefore expected that as
mandatory disclosure demands become a requirement for token
issuers, information intermediaries will enter the arena and assist
investors by processing the information and putting the right price
tag on the token. This will assist in stabilizing the market and allowing capital to flow in an efficient way.
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But, what about cryptocurrencies that are not securities—
should we regulate them beyond the general anti-fraud regulation?
If so, how?
2. Regulation of Cryptocurrencies that Are Not Securities
The question of regulation is more complex when it comes to
cryptocurrencies that are closer to a real currency. In such cases, we
generally do not need to protect the market, as these tokens are not
taking away resources from the securities market. Therefore, at first
glance, there is no need for regulatory intervention, apart from antifraud regulatory measures which can prevent token issuers from
promising to issue a token, collecting the money, and then disappearing. To clarify this point—as we do not prevent investors from
buying shares in private firms without mandated disclosure, or from
taking all their money and buying a trip around the world—regulatory intervention is not needed in places where there is no market
failure which prevents the mar-ket from being efficient. Therefore,
the question should be: is there a market failure related to the sale
of cryptocurrencies that are currencies and not securities or other
financial products? The answer to that is, in some cases, yes.
Market failures may become apparent as a result of cryptocurrencies that are not securities when these tokens become systemically important and affect financial institutions. As mentioned
previously, systemic risk results from the interconnectedness of
firms on the financial markets. 276 Interconnectedness results from
the fact that the value of one firm in the market is dependent on the
payoffs it receives from its claims on other firms. The value of these
claims depends, in turn, on the stability of other firms and so on.277
When firms are interconnected, the failure of one financial institution might have a cascading effect and bring down other large financial institutions in a chain reaction.
If financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies,
start getting involved with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, then the
fluctuation in the price of the token might affect the stability of the
276
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financial institutions. This in turn may cause an increase in systemic
risk in the “real world” financial system. For example, even though
the insurance industry has responded slowly to the surge of cryptocurrencies and ICOs, some insurance companies, such as the Great
American Insurance Group, have added protection against cryptocurrency theft to their existing business crime policy. 278 Banks were
also keen to join in on the trend.279 Barclays has become the first
bank to accept Bitcoin.280 The bank began by allowing people to
make donations in Bitcoins.281 It then started allowing a U.S. mobile
payment startup—backed by Goldman Sachs, which uses Bitcoin to
transfer central bank currencies—to use its infrastructure. 282
All of the above mentioned traits give rise to concerns
involving increased systemic risk in the financial system and
require regulatory intervention. Here, regulators should find a way
to regulate the token or, if not, it would be advised to prohibit
financial institutions from joining and engaging in activities that
may expose them to fluctuations in cryptocurrency prices, therefore
increasing systemic risk in the financial system.
CONCLUSION

In summary, different types of cryptocurrencies behave differently from one another. Although the technology underpinning most
cryptocurrencies is quite similar, the logic behind them differs.
Some cryptocurrencies function as regular national currencies and
possess traits of traditional currency. As such, they provide a medium of exchange, unit of account, and/or store of value. However,
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other cryptocurrencies may represent different rights as well.
This fascinating phenomenon essentially leads to some cryptocurrencies being viewed more closely to real national currencies
while others appear more akin to financial products—such as securities or derivatives.
The cryptocurrency phenomenon requires regulatory authorities
to investigate each new ICO and to determine the token’s classification. Some tokens, such as Bitcoin, actually do resemble currency
and should therefore only be regulated to ensure that fraudulent
behavior is prevented. These types of cryptocurrencies should be
more carefully regulated in case they increase systemic risk in
the general financial system. Other tokens—such as DAO, Ether,
and Libra—resemble securities and should be regulated accordingly. The main distinction between the two types of cryptocurrencies relates to the question of whether or not their value is dependent
on the efforts of others.
For cryptocurrencies that are in fact securities, additional mandatory disclosure should be required with respect to security issues
surrounding the ICO. Investors should be informed about what kind
of blockchain technology is being used, who developed the code,
and whether it was published publicly. In addition, information
about what kind of cyber audits were conducted prior to the issuance
of the coin is essential.
The steps and solutions suggested by this Article should support
regulatory authorities in their ability to protect financial markets
while still allowing room for innovation.

